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Introduction 
Brazil and Mexico have followed quite different development strategies. This paper 
focuses on a parallel between their trade policies since the 80’s as a proxy to an 
interventionist/reformist and a liberal/oligopolistic development model.  
Major differences emerged with the fatigue of Import Substitution Industrialization 
in the late 70’s. Since the 1982 moratorium, Mexico embarked on liberal reforms 
leading to the NAFTA: small value added exports, little innovation and concentration 
on the US market.  
 Brazil preserved interventionist policies. Extensive trade liberalization came about 
only in 1990. “Real Plan” closed out inflation and launched sustainable stabilization.  
Mercosur´s dynamism came to a halt but commodity exports to China boomed.   
Crucial tests came in the years 2000. Brazil sailed well, outperformed Mexico and 
became one of the largest emerging economies. A more gradualist opening of the 
economy, diversified markets and innovation may explain the distinct results.   
The decisive element in development differentials between the two countries was the 
emergence of a wide, deep rooted  reformist movement in Brazil.  Laid down in the mid 
90’s with the Real Plan, implemented along eight years under Cardoso, its basic features 
were not abandoned by Lula.  
 
Exhaustion of a Similar Model (Import Substitution Industrialization - ISI). 
Emergence of Distinct Trade Policies Patterns 
 
Similarities in ISI but Differences in Stabilization Policies 
 
Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) prevailed both in Brazil and Mexico from 
the 50’s to the 70’s. It was structured on high tariff rates, important foreign direct 
investment (the so-called “tariff jumping”), heavy public investment and, as a 
consequence, high rates of economic growth.  
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ISI guaranteed a domestic market practically free from external competition and 
generated high rates of profits and investment. Its instruments included high ad valorem 
tariffs and import licensing, both typical non- tariff barriers. Import licensing was not 
only targeted at protectionism, but also at exchange rate market management and 
availability of foreign currency. Signs of exhaustion of the ISI model were already 
visible by the end of the 70’s, when rates of economic growth started declining. In 1985 
it was already  discarded as a prevailing foreign trade model, while  in Brazil only later 
in 1990.  
One important difference between Brazil and Mexico already prevailed in the distant 
eras of the 50’s and the early 60’s: stabilization policies. Whereas in Mexico the ISI 
model was known as “an era of growth with stabilization”, in Brazil it was accompanied 
by structural  high inflation rates.  They resulted from expansionary monetary and fiscal 
policies, associated with high foreign direct investment in sectors such as automotive 
industries. There were also significant public investment in large hydroelectric power 
plants (Paulo Afonso and Três Marias), and key highways linking the inland with the 
coast. The most controversial and inflationary project was  the construction of a new 
capital, Brasilia, from 1956 to 1960.  In the late 50’s, President Kubitschek, the 
archetype of Brazilian “desenvolvimentismo”, broke ties with the IMF. Brazil lived 
under chronic high inflation rates for long four decades up to the mid- 90’s, when the 
Real Plan, a turning point in Brazilian history, inaugurated a new era of reformism 
which paved the way for stabilization, modernization, sustainable macroeconomic 
fundamentals, economic growth and social policies prevailing up to now.  
 
Differences in the 70’s and 80’s 
 
MEXICO 
A very significant difference, with visible trade policy effects, is related to the roots 
of the 1982 moratorium. Mexico, with recent huge oil reserves, practiced at that time 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policy under the assumption that high international oil 
prices would continue. With drastic fall in oil prices after 1981 (oil accounted then for 
71% of total exports) and high expansionary fiscal policy, the government had to 
implement strong protectionist policies, reversing some liberal measures introduced in 
the late 70’s. A halt of foreign capital inflow combined high interest rates in the 
international market, led Mexico to exhaust its foreign reserves, default service 
payments of its foreign debt and declare a moratorium. 
In the mid 80’s it embarked on a reassessment of its previous protectionist policies of 
ISI and initiated a period of deep structural reform leading to generalized trade 
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liberalization.  In 1986 Mexico joined GATT and later, in 1994 became a member of 
OECD, a typical developed countries’ organization.  
Mexico realized that its main economic shortcomings were associated both with 
external factors outside its control - fluctuations in oil prices - and flawed economic 
policies. Both led to overvalued Peso and high dependence on oil exports. The country 
fulfilled a deep structural reform having trade liberalization as one of its main pillars. 
Important results were quickly achieved: oil exports as a percentage of total exports had 
declined from 78% in 1982 to 32% in 19881. 
 Prior to the 1985 trade liberalization, Mexico had already travelled a long journey of 
macroeconomic discipline. To face the effects of the moratorium, it achieved a fiscal 
adjustment of great proportions and the current account reverted into a surplus already 
in 1983. Instrumental to such adjustment was a maxi-devaluation of around 250% in 
1982, GDP contraction of 4.2% in 1983, downfall of imports and moderate export 
growth2.  
Since 1985 President De la Madrid started trade liberalization, privatization and a 
friendly foreign investment environment. These policies were underpinned by Salinas 
de Gortari, former Plan and Budget Secretary and later President, following widely 
recognized fraudulent elections. A Harvard graduate, he led a team of PhDs from 
Harvard/MIT who introduced sweeping economic reforms with two main pillars: 
overcoming the long standing debt crisis and negotiating a FTA with the US. The first 
came with the Brady Plan and its bonuses with smaller nominal values which were 
accepted by creditors and opened the way to new foreign investment in Mexico. The 
second came true with Nafta.  
 
BRAZIL 
 Brazil’s path was quite different. Stagnation in 1981-83, like Mexico’s, resulted 
from high foreign debt associated with large international loans contracted throughout 
the 70’s. However, in a marked difference from Mexico, Brazil’s foreign debt was 
channeled toward productive investments in new and diversified sectors, under the 
Second National Development Plan (II PND). In the latter half of the 70’s, they were 
decisive  in creating a more solid physical and industrial infrastructure and promoting  
outstanding advances in science and technology applied to agriculture and energy by the 
Brazilian Enterprise for Agricultural Research (EMBRAPA) and PETROBRAS. 
However, not all initiatives invigorated infrastructure or arouse gains in productivity.  A 
few  squandered public funds lavishly:  nuclear program with Germany was a failure; 
ferrovia do aço, a Northern railway; and the utopia of creating a nationally based  
                                                
1 Nolan, Kimberly. Política Comercial Mexicana de 1985 a 2010. Mimeo. CIDE. 2010. P. 6. 
2 Mostafa, Joana. México: Paradigma de Dependência Regional, de Trajetórias Recentes de 
Desenvolvimento, Estudos de Experiências Internacionais Selecionadas. 2009. P. 92.  
  
4 
4 
information technology (IT) cluster in the early 80’s, when  PC’s were sprawling 
globally, was a flawed policy, but finally abandoned. 
 There was a process of substantial investments in key areas, such as 
telecommunication, transportation, hydroelectric power plants (Itaipu, the largest in the 
world until the construction of the Three Gorges in China), petrochemicals, alumina, 
paper and pulp, steel and capital goods. A policy of export promotion of industrialized 
goods with heavy subsidies and incentives was put into effect in the 70’s and 80’s, but 
later abandoned following the Tokyo Round of  multilateral trade negotiations. 
Therefore, with strict external constraints, Brazil developed its domestic market, 
following a policy of substantial public investment in infrastructure and basic industries. 
Such policy   paved the way for exports of industrialized, semi-industrialized goods and 
highly competitive agribusiness products  in the following decades.    
Until the end of the 80’s, Brazil continued to follow the same protectionist trade 
policy based on a tariff rate structure set up in 1957, as well as on a number of taxes,  on 
financial operations, improving harbors, fostering the merchant fleet, to name a few.  
There was a generalized application of non-tariff barriers apart from the existence of 42 
special import regimes, with tariff exemption or reduction. These policies underpinned 
growth of diversified manufacturing sectors, although not to a level compatible with a 
solid integration with the international market3. 
Under the threat of a serious exchange rate crisis starting in 1982, associated with the 
high exchange rates following the second oil shock(1999) and the  Mexican 
moratorium, Brazil had to look for IMF assistance and was supposed to implement its 
adjustment policy. In spite of IMF conditionalities, Brazil lived throughout the 80’s and 
up to the beginning of the 90’s an extended high inflationary period, interrupted by a 
sequence of five failed stabilization plans and a moratorium in 1986. The adjustment 
process had important trade policy effects. In order to honor international commitments, 
Brazil had to produce mega trade surpluses. There was a substantial drop in GDP and 
domestic aggregate demand leading to a huge import reduction. Several types of import 
control mechanisms were introduced. In 1983 a maxi-devaluation was put in effect to 
further trade surpluses. Ever since, a system of mini-devaluation was implemented, so 
as to avoid an inflation-led erosion of the previous maxi devaluation. High inflation 
rates prevailed in spite of the IMF conditionalities.  
The adjustment process negotiated with the IMF produced mega trade surpluses 
(supported by heavy export subsidies), which was one of IMF’s top priority policy 
objectives. This implied a strong fiscal deterioration in the first half of the 80’s4. In 
order to achieve that strategic objective, there was a substantial drop in domestic 
aggregate demand. However, production continued to grow, as generalized use of 
                                                
3 Cardoso, Eliana. A Brief History of Trade Policies in Brazil: from ISI, Export Promotion and Import 
Liberalization to Multilateral and Regional Agreements, 2009. P. 7. 
4 Baer, Monica. El rumbo perdido: la crisis final y financiera del Estado brasileño. São Paulo: Paz y 
Terra, 1993. P.74.  
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indexation, which preserved high profits and investments.  Brazilian crawling peg was 
also known as “inflation without tears”. This is a half  truth: no tears for industries  up 
to a point, since it had a feedback  on inflation; but a disaster for income distribution.    
Trade mechanisms, such as heavy subsidies and tax exemptions applied to promote 
exports, contributed to aggravate the fiscal debt. In a context of ISI, with a non 
competitive industrial sector and the need to generate mega trade surpluses, the State 
made generalized use of those mechanisms. In spite of its negative fiscal effects, they 
were effective in increasing industrial goods exports and in creating mega trade 
surpluses. However, exports accounted then for a minor share of GDP.  
Such trade policies implemented until the first half of the 80’s aggravated the process 
of income concentration in a historically unequal economy. Actually, they benefited 
directly exporters of industrial goods and victimized workers, whose real salaries were 
continuously reduced by an indexation-led inflation rate. Several Memoranda of 
Understanding were signed with the IMF, but never fully implemented.  
In synthesis, trade policies in the first half of the 80’s in Brazil followed a non-
orthodox adjustment process which did not open the economy,  but achieved high trade 
surpluses, by means of indexation and export subsidies. The inflation rate was high, but 
indexation neutralized its negative effects on production. This policy was formally 
structured on IMF’s conditionalities, but in practice, has not followed them. Brazil 
consistently maintained those disequilibria which favored the export sector at the 
expenses of domestic consumption and the living standard of the middle and lower 
classes. Obviously this strategy was only possible in the political context of an 
authoritarian regime. From 1964 to 1985, under military rule, there were no real 
democratic mechanisms, neither effective political parties nor active labor unions.  
 
Consolidation of Mexican Trade Liberalization Policy. NAFTA as a Watershed 
 
In the 90’s, under the Baker Plan (1995) and later the Brady Plan (1997), Mexico 
underwent broad, deep structural adjustment reforms. Some of its components included  
opening  the economy, adoption of a maximum tariff rate of 20%,  promotion of foreign 
direct investment, financial liberalization since 1989 and the privatization of the three 
largest banks (Banamex, Bancomer and Serfim), of Aeromexico and Mexicana5. 
In 1993, as stated by Krugman, “the most important restrictions were lifted, foreign 
investors were welcome, enthusiasm over Mexico´s potential grew”6. Then came the 
bad year of 1994: riots in Chiapas; mounting dollar indexed tesobonos debt; Tequila 
                                                
5 Mostafa, Joana. 2009. Idem. P. 94 
6Krugman, Paul R. De Vuelta a la Economia de la Gran Depression. Grupo Editorial Norma, 1999. P. 84. 
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Crisis; American financial rescue worth US$ 50 billion. One and half year later, once 
more Mexico was a great place for American investors. Therefore, if one abstracts the 
Tequila Crisis, the Mexican economy did pretty well in terms of macroeconomic 
fundamentals, open foreign trade and credibility for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). 
In spite of those reforms, it became clear that liberalization by itself would not attract 
enough foreign capital to honor its foreign debt. Thus, free trade agreements (FTA’s) 
with important partners became a priority for President Salinas, who took power in 
1990 under a strict liberal banner. As the first attempt of a FTA failed, following the 
European Economic Community’s refusal, Mexico started negotiations with the US 
(later with Canada) in 1991. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was 
signed in 1992, but became effective only on January 1st, 1994, after the approval of 
side agreements on labor and environment. 
Large enterprises provided the main support for the negotiation process. For them, 
NAFTA was an instrument for effective implementation of open economic policies, 
preserving trade liberalization and removing further tariff barriers, which would make 
them more competitive. A new representative body was created, the Coordinating 
Agency of Foreign Trade Enterprise Organizations – COECE. Opposition to NAFTA      
came mostly from small and medium size enterprises (gathered around the National 
Chamber of Processing Industries – CANACINTRA), which were apprehensive with 
the possible elimination of still existing protectionist barriers which favored them. The 
government strategy consisted of excluding CANACINTRA from the negotiation 
process. Therefore, sectors such as textiles, furniture, metals and shoes have not played 
a relevant role in the negotiation process and were later provided with further credit and 
other benefits, as compensation7.  
An assessment of NAFTA must recognize that exports boomed, being multiplied by 
four from 1994 to 1998. However, dependence on the US market soared, from 65% of 
total trade in 1980 to 80% when the treaty was finalized. Attempts to reduce  
undesirable dependence on a sole market were not fruitful. Agreements with Central 
American countries (the Central American Free Trade Area - CAFTA) have not 
generated significant trade flows, given its political motivation and the small scale of 
the economies. Mexico signed an FTA with Chile in 1992 and later with Uruguay, 
maybe contemplating to be an associate member of Mercosur. 
Efforts to diversify Mexican foreign trade have not shown substantial concrete 
results, even with large economies such as those of the European Union (Global 
Agreement of 2000) and Japan (FTA signed in 2004)8.  Brazil’s experience was quite 
the opposite. No Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was finalized with any large economy, 
but the country consolidated its profile as a global trader.   
                                                
7 Nolan, Kimberly. 2010. Idem, P. 9. 
8 Nolan, Kimberly. 2010. Idem. P. 14. 
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An objective assessment of present day Mexican trade policy seems to suggest that 
diversification should be further pursued. Two factors recommend additional efforts 
towards trade diversification. The first is related to the aftermath of the 2008 
international economic crisis, which revealed Mexico as the most negatively affected 
Latin American economy, with a 6.5% GDP decline in 2009. The second is associated 
with the fact that the large emerging economies are growing faster than those of 
developed countries and are leading international economic recovery.  
In a context where diversification of Mexico’s foreign trade is needed and should 
focus on large emerging economies, it would be advisable to continue negotiations of 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with Brazil. It should be stressed that Brazil faces 
strong hurdles to negotiate FTAs which stem from two main factors. First, as member 
of a Customs Union within Mercosur, negotiations have to include all four members, a 
circumstance which obviously makes things more complex. Second, there are non 
negligible ideological resistances on the part of some segments of the present 
government towards FTAs, which are viewed as a “neoliberal” instrument. In the 
specific case of an FTA with Mexico, there is an agreement within Mercosur allowing 
member states  to negotiate on  individual bases.  Uruguay, for instance, already has an 
FTA with Mexico.  
 Mexico may profit from such an agreement by diversifying its trade. Brazil certainly 
would benefit by concluding its first FTA with an economy with dimensions similar to 
its own. Up to now Brazil has no significant FTA, a circumstance which adversely 
affects its access to foreign markets by eroding its margin of preference in bilateral trade 
vis-à-vis other countries having signed FTAs.  
 
Brazil’s Trade Liberalization in 1990. The Rise of Mercosur 
 
1990 was the year when Brazil made its most radical move toward tariff reduction 
and opening its economy. Ideologically, this was the result of President Collor’s 
determination to abolish “nacional-desarrollismo” and to move firmly towards a global 
liberal path under the banner of modernization9.  
Trade liberalization measures resulted in substantial reduction of the effective 
average tariff rate in 1990-1993, from 37% to 15%, and in 1994 it reached an average of 
12.3%10. The openness of the economy (X+M/GDP) doubled in the period 1990-2008, 
moving from 13.6% to 26%11. Trade surpluses also revealed drastic moves in three 
                                                
9 Cervo, Amado L. Política de Comercio Exterior y Desarrollo: La Experiencia Brasileña. Revista 
Brasileña de Política Internacional. 40 (2): 5-26. 1997. P. 15. 
10 Cardoso, Eliana. 2009. Idem. P. 10. 
11 Baumann, Renato. Brazilian External Sector so far in the XXI Century, Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean-ECLAC. 2010. PP. 1 y 5. 
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different moments. In 1988, during the mega surpluses period, it reached US$19.1 
billion; during the first period of the Real Plan (created in mid-1994) and in the year of 
the introduction of a floating exchange rate policy (1998), which prevailed ever since, 
there was a trade deficit of US$6.4 billion. In the boom years of commodity prices and 
growth of the international economy (2008), it reached a peak of US$25 billion12.  
This paper supports the view that trade liberalization of 1990 had positive effects on 
boosting productivity, based on Eliana Cardoso13 and Marcelo Paiva Abreu14. However, 
the issue is still controversial, as reflected in Miranda skeptical approach about links 
between trade opening and productivity gains15 
In 1991, Brazil made a political and economic option for Mercosur. Its roots date 
back to a series of economic bilateral agreements with Argentina in 1986-88 and  to the 
1990 Buenos Aires Protocol.  But for the first time the 1991 Treaty of Asunción defines 
a chronogram for a defined tariff reduction every six months.   
The 90’s was the golden age of Mercosur. Intra-bloc trade was multiplied by five 
from 1990 (one year previous to its creation) to 1998 (one year prior to the Brazilian 
exchange rate crisis, the major devaluation of the Real and the downfall of Argentina’s 
economy), going from US$4 billion to US$20 billion. Obviously, part of this robust 
growth was associated with trade diversion, but Brazilian investments in the other 
economies, mostly Argentina, but Uruguay and Paraguay as well, contributed to trade 
creation. 
Immediately after that initial period, intra-Mercosur trade declined as a result 
Argentina’s  long and severe crisis in 2000.  As argued by Baumann16, later Mercosur 
was no longer a source of dynamism for  Brazil. This argument is in part explained by 
the much faster growth of the Brazilian economy in contrast with the slowdown in its 
major partner, Argentina. The Center for Studies of Integration and Development 
(Cebri/Cides) points out that  deficit of implementation of the free trade zone combined 
with lack of coordination of macroeconomic policies led to insufficient export 
dynamism by the smaller partners. In contrast with modest intra-bloc trade growth, 
Mercosur  social agenda expanded forcefully and foreign policy coordination process 
among members within South America gained weight and importance.  
In the 90’s and in the first decade of 2000 Mercosur’s opposition to the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA) was in sharp contrast with Mexico’s support. The 
initiative, sponsored by the US and involving 34 countries, was finally abandoned. 
                                                
12 Averburg, André. Apertura e Integración Comercial Brasileña en la Década de los 90, en La Economía 
Brasileña en los  90. Organizadores: Fabio Giambiagi y Mauricio Mesquita Moreira. BNDES. P.49 y 
Baumman. Idem. P. 2.  
13 Cardoso, Eliana. 2009. Idem. 
14 Abreu, Marcelo De Paiva. Comercio Exterior. Interesses Do Brasil. 2007. 
15 Miranda, José Carlos. Apertura Comercial, Reestructuración Industrial y exportaciones Brasileñas en la 
Década de 1990. 2001. IPEA. Texto para Discusión 829. P.11.  
16 Abreu e Lima Florêncio, Sérgio. Treinta Años de Política de Comercio Exterior de Brasil. 
Intervencionismo, Apertura Comercial y Estabilización Económica. 2010. Mimeo. P. 24.  
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Substantially different views on key issues between Brazil and the US explain its 
failure. Brazil favored an agenda focused on technical standards, agricultural subsidies 
and dispute settlement, whereas the US attributed higher priority to market access for 
goods and services, intellectual property rights, government purchases and competition 
policies17. 
 
Final Remarks 
 
Five conclusions on development strategies may be drawn from a parallel between 
Brazilian and Mexican trade policies over the last thirty years. 
First. The late opening of the Brazilian economy was a comparative advantage, since 
it was precisely in the late 70´s and throughout the 80´s that the industrial infrastructure 
and the innovation process most strongly advanced. These two features contributed to 
substantial productivity gains in following decades and until now.   
 This paper does not advocate at all the defense of a state-run inward looking 
development. Late opening was an advantage since it was temporary and followed by a 
substantial trade liberalization in the year 1990, which brought about a rupture with 
Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). Trade liberalization did not bring 
disindustrialization.  On the contrary, it forced Brazil’s  industrial sector to modernize, 
gain efficiency, and compete regionally and globally. Exponential competitiveness of 
Brazilian agribusiness today would not have materialized without modern, productive 
domestic sectors such as transportation equipment and capital goods. A large domestic 
market has fostered scale and productivity in the early stages of industrialization, but 
became obviously insufficient to promote competitiveness on a global scale. 
Mexico, in contrast, after several decades of ISI similar to Brazil and many other 
Latin American countries, followed a different pattern in the last thirty years. Open 
trade policy in the 80´s became a clear priority. Ultimate results were: no space for 
industrial policies; lack of incentives for innovation; small value added industrial 
exports as the most dynamic sector; loss of market share in the US as a result of Chinese 
competition; strong dependence on a slow growing US economy;  and few links with 
dynamic large emerging economies.  
Second. IMF’s role in stabilization process in Brazil and Mexico was quite different. 
In the case of Mexico macroeconomic policies since the 1982 moratorium have 
followed a pattern dictated by the international institution. Open foreign trade policies 
and IMF’s structural adjustment process became a clear policy under De la Madrid 
since 1985. Those features solidified following the American US$50 billion rescue to 
                                                
17 Abreu, Marcelo de Paiva. 2007. Idem. P. 62.  
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overcome the Tequila Crisis in 1994. Mexico’s new President Salinas de Gortari, a 
Harvard graduate, led a team of PhD´s from Harvard/ MIT who introduced sweeping 
economic reforms with two main pillars: overcoming the long standing debt crisis and 
negotiating  a  FTA with the US. The first came with the Brady Plan and its bonuses 
with smaller nominal values which were accepted by creditors and opened the way to 
new foreign investment in Mexico. The second came true with Nafta.  
Brazil during the 70´s, 80´s and mid 90´s was erratic but never strictly followed 
IMF´s orthodoxy. Letters of intent were signed but systematically bypassed.  Actually 
this is almost a tradition dating back to the late 50´s, when a visionary President built 
the new capital,  launched a long cycle of rampant inflation and ostensibly cut ties with 
the IMF.  
Throughout the mid 80’s and mid 90´s – with the exception of the 1994 Tequila 
Crisis – Mexico was seen as a successful economic model: open, dynamic, stable. 
Brazil was then the victim of traditional vices: chronic rampant inflation; obsolete 
overprotected industries; populist macroeconomics; unstable democracy. Only in the 
mid 90’s the Real Plan broke with four decades of high inflation and inaugurated a long 
cycle of sustainable growth structured on sound macroeconomic fundamentals.  
Third. Mercosur and Nafta have generated great initial expectations. Now they are a 
source of great frustrations. Both are irreversible, both require deep adjustments.  
In terms of trade agreements, a Mercosur - Nafta parallel is a kind of David - Golias 
exercise. Nafta means for Mexico: scale; export oriented growth; low-value added 
exports; high foreign direct investment (FDI) flows; financial rescue during adversities 
such as the 1994 Tequila Crisis; macroeconomic discipline; and dependence. Mercosur 
has brought to Brazil:  an initial decade of accelerated industrial goods export; sluggish 
growth in  intra-bloc trade ever since; negligible source of foreign trade dynamism; 
serious constraints for Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) negotiations; no macroeconomic 
coordination; dense cultural and technical cooperation agenda in different areas; and 
quite relevant foreign policy coordination mechanism, especially in the South America 
arena. 
Mercosur was mainly a political project with a strong economic integration 
dimension. It was the recognition of Brazil´s expanding role in South America and later 
in Latin America, as well as a vehicle for trade integration. It experienced strong 
dynamism throughout the 90´s, in contrast with present modest growth. Its importance 
for Brazil´s foreign trade has been declining and is not anymore a significant source of 
trade creation. These new circumstances explain a tendency to reassess Brazilian policy 
and some paradigms.  Brazil’s robust growth along 2004 - 2008, linked with the boom 
in commodity exports (China) widened asymmetries within Mercosur.  As a customs 
union, it adopts a common external tariff.  Negotiations of trade agreements with third 
countries must necessarily involve all members, adding complexity to such exercises. 
This paper advocates additional flexibility provided a customs union format prevails.  
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The goal is to provide more freedom to Brazil and other member states in trade 
agreements negotiations with third countries.  
Nafta was a paramount shift. In Octavio Paz´s metaphor, Mexico turned its back to 
history and assumed its geography. It raised passionate debates. It diminished Mexican 
foreign policy influence in spite of efforts to counterbalance. Dependence to the US 
market was already a previous reality, but aggravated with the agreement. The most 
relevant aspect was to bring discipline to Mexican economic policies and thus create a 
predictable, favorable environment for foreign investment. It was a great step to firmly 
link both economies. However, for more than a decade, Mexico has been  losing market 
share to Chinese goods in the US  and suffering competition from China in the domestic 
market. At the moment of its creation, Nafta symbolized an agreement with a huge, fast 
growing country. Today it means dependence on a near stagnant economy. Efforts 
toward trade diversification have brought negligible results. Instead of a solution, Nafta 
became a problem. But it is obviously irreversible, like Mercosur. 
Fourth. Sustainable macroeconomic policies were a latecomer in Brazil. They only 
materialized after four failed stabilization plans all implemented  in  short eight years, 
each one creating a new national currency. In the mid 90´s the Real Plan – initially an 
anathema for the IMF – made possible to surmount four decades of chronic high 
inflation. It inaugurated sustainable stabilization, promoted fiscal equilibrium, 
privatized key sectors (telecommunications, aviation, steel, iron ore), dissolved debt 
ridden state banks, introduced regulatory agencies, modernized civil service 
bureaucracy and introduced  effective non-assistentialist social policies. These wide 
ranging reforms were formulated and implemented along Cardoso’s two terms, a total 
of eight years.  Lula gave continuity to previous macroeconomic policies, but 
introduced more laxity in the fiscal area.  His Presidency halted the reform process, 
more than doubled the number of politically appointed public officers and significantly 
loosened public expenditures. This last point means that stabilization depends mostly on 
monetary policy, aggravating upward pressure on traditionally high interest rates. 
Cardoso comprehensive reformist agenda was not circumscribed to macroeconomic 
adjustment and modernization of the economy. It  covered many other key  areas, such 
as: public administration enhancement; universal access to primary education and 
introduction of regular evaluation systems (Enem and Provão); breakthrough in  health 
(Unified Health System- SUS); and inauguration of modern social policies in the 
modality of Conditional Cash Transfer Payments, as Bolsa Escola. 
Social policies under Lula were widened and deepened.  Bolsa Familia brought 
visible positive results in terms of  drastic decline in poverty and  extreme poverty as 
well as  inequality reduction. Commendable results of Lula’s social policies were 
closely linked to a virtuous cycle combining vigorous rates of economic growth derived 
from extremely high commodity prices with Brazil’s robust competitiveness in primary 
products.  
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 Cardoso’s solid, long standing reformist movement dating back to the mid 90´s was 
a turning point in Brazilian history. It paved the way for accelerated economic growth 
during 2004 – 2008, when the country benefited from high commodity prices and 
excess liquidity in financial markets. Significant trade surpluses and large inflow of 
foreign capital generated high international reserves which served as a cushion to 
mitigate the domestic effects of the  international economic crisis.  
Fifth. This paper has three fundamental messages: late trade liberalization was an 
asset; resilience to avoid IMF’s orthodox structural adjustment policies proved right; 
and the decisive factor in development differentials between Brazil and Mexico was the 
comprehensive reformist movement led by Cardoso and followed by Lula with some 
economic pitfalls but social gains.  Brazil’s path since the Real Plan proves Victor 
Hugo’s insight: “Nothing can stop an idea whose time has come”.  
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